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Development thresholds of foreign aid effectiveness in Africa
Abstract
Purpose – This paper examines whether initial levels in GDP growth, GDP per capita growth 
and inequality  adjusted human development  matter  in the impact  of aid on development.  In 
substance  its  object  is  to  assess  if  threshold  development  conditions  are  necessary  for  the 
effectiveness of foreign-aid in Africa. 
Design/methodology/approach –  The  panel  quantile  regression  technique  enables  us  to 
investigate if the relationship between development dynamics and development assistance differs 
throughout the distributions of development dynamics.
Findings –  Two  main  findings  are  established.  (1)  The  effectiveness  of  aid  in  economic 
prosperity (at micro and macro levels) increases in positive magnitude across the distribution. 
This implies high-growth countries are more likely to benefit from development assistance (in 
terms of economic prosperity) than their low-growth counterparts. (2) Existing levels of human 
development  do  not  affect  the  manner  in  which  foreign-aid  negatively  affects  human 
emancipation.  Thus  the  negative  incidence  of  aid  on  human  emancipation  is  almost  similar 
across the human development distribution. 
Practical  implications –  Two  policy  implications  result.  (1)  Blanket  policies  on  the  aid-
economic prosperity nexus are unlikely to succeed in Africa; thus policy measures should be 
contingent on prevailing levels of economic growth and tailored differently across high and low 
growth countries. (2) Common policies could be applied within the framework of the aid-human 
development nexus regardless of country-specific (existing) human emancipation levels.
Originality/value – This paper contributes to existing literature on the effectiveness of foreign-
aid by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variables (development dynamics).  It is 
likely that high and low growth countries respond differently to development assistance. 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa
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1. Introduction 
The concern  over  the  effectiveness  of  foreign-aid has  been widely debated  since  the 
institution of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs over five decades ago. A 
great chunk of the literature focusing on the macroeconomic impact of aid is mixed at best on the 
results  and  those  that  have  revealed  significant  positive  effects  face  heavy  methodological 
criticisms (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005). Beside the antagonistic picture of the macroeconomic 
merits  of  development-assistance  painted  by mainstream research,  there  has  been  an  almost 
exclusive focus on the effect of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables 
(investment or public consumption), with the underlying assumption being the notion that aid is 
destined to bridge the saving-investment  gap poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & 
Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005a). Surprisingly, there has been much less research conducted on the 
impact of foreign-aid on the evolution of human development(Masud & Yontcheva,2005),  in 
spite of the shift in objectives announced by the donor community which have evolved from 
intensive industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more poverty reducing objectives 
such the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs). 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is fourfold. Firstly, we deviate from the 
mainstream  approach  to  the  aid-development  nexus  and  assess  the  effectiveness  of  foreign 
assistance  from  three  dimensions  (GDP  growth,  GDP  per  capita  growth  and  human 
development). Secondly, a substantial body of work in the literature is based on data collected 
between 1960 and 1995. By using much recent data, the paper provides an updated account of 
the nexus with more focused policy implications. Another novelty worth pointing-out within this 
contribution is the use of an updated human development index (adjusted for inequality) first 
published in 2010 that corrects past works of the bulk of criticisms inherent in the first index. 
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Thirdly,  owing  to  the  debate  on  methodological  issues  in  the  assessment  of  foreign-aid 
effectiveness,  this  paper  provides  new  dimensions  to  the  debate  by  investigating  the  aid-
development nexus when existing development levels matter. Thus there is a presumption here 
that certain development thresholds might be imperative for the effectiveness of foreign-aid and 
hence blanket aid policies might not be appropriate, unless they are contingent on the prevailing 
levels of development dynamics (GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and human development) 
and tailored differently across high and low growth developing countries. Fourthly, with the year 
2015 approaching, it is high time to assess donors’ objective of reaching the MDGs. In plainer 
terms, examining the effectiveness of development assistance on human development by virtue 
of the three points highlighted above (in the run-up to 2015) could provide crucial policy options 
to donor and multilateral agencies on their assistance (aid) impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on aid-
effectiveness.  Measurement  and  methodology  issues  are  discussed  in  Section  3.  Empirical 
analysis is covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5. 
2. Literature review
2.1 Theoretical highlights 
The imperative of aid in the improvement of GDP growth can be traced back to the two-
gap  model  (Chenery  &  Strout,  1966),  which  remains  the  most  influential  theoretical 
underpinning of the aid effectiveness literature. In this model, developing countries face draw-
backs in savings and export earnings that deter investment and economic growth. Though it has 
suffered  from  severe  criticism  since  its  inception,  this  model  has  provided  the  underlying 
principles both for early aid policies(Easterly,  1999) and regression specifications in the aid-
growth(savings) empirical literature(Masud & Yontcheva,2005).
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2.2 Conflicts in the literature 
Literature pertaining to the effectiveness of aid has almost exclusively been focused on 
the  macroeconomic  impacts  of  aid,  thus  examining  the  effects  of  aid  on economic  savings, 
investment and growth. The absence of an analytical framework, heavy reliance on empirical 
evidence(which is  often ambiguous  for the most  part)  and inconclusive results  with recently 
refined  methodologies(Masud  & Yontcheva,2005),  leaves  the  subject  matter  widely  open to 
debate.  For organizational  reasons,  literature  pertaining to  the effectiveness  of aid in growth 
(development)  could  be  categorized  into  two strands as  summarized  in  Table  1  below:  one 
purporting the negative consequences of aid and the other acknowledging the positive rewards of 
development assistance. 
The first panel entails a strand of authors presenting the case for the insignificant impact 
of aid on investment, savings or growth. Aid has been confirmed to improve unproductive public 
consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) and fails to increase investment at best. This later point has 
been supported by Reichel(1995) and Boone(1996). Ghura(1995) pointed-out the negative effect 
of aid on domestic savings whereas Pedersen(1996) asserted foreign-aid distorts development 
and leads to aid dependency. In the second strand, we find studies favoring the positive effects of 
aid on growth (development). It is interesting to highlight the Burnside & Dollar (2000) work 
that has received abundant comments from researchers (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Colier & 
Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003), whose results have been challenged as being “extremely data 
dependent”(Clemens et al.,2004).
5
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature
 Researchers Main findings 
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth(development)
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid increases unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth.
Reichel(1995) Aid fails to promote savings owing to the substitution effect.
Ghura(1995) Aid negatively impacts savings.
Boone(1996) Aid  is  insignificant  in  improving  economic  development  for  two  reasons: 
poverty is not caused by capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to 
adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows.
Pedersen (1996) Foreign Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency.
Asongu(2012a) Development assistance is perilous to government quality dynamics 
Asongu(2012b) Development assistance is inhumane and leads to reversed economics
Second-strand : Aid improves growth(development)
Burnside & Dollar(2000) Aid can be effective when policies and economic management are good.
Ghura(1995) Aids positively impacts savings for good adjusters. 
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors(shocks and hazards).
Collier & Dehn(2001) Aid effectiveness  depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 
on negative supply shocks is better than targeting based on good policies. 
Collier & Dollar(2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per-capita
income growth and the impact of per-capita income growth on poverty
reduction.
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly
in line with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human
well-being. 
Gomanee et al.(2003) Aid  has  either  a  direct  effect  on  welfare  and  indirect  effect  through  public 
spending on social services. 
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive impact on growth.
Ishfaq (2004) Foreign aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the
extent of poverty in Pakistan.
Mosley et al. (2004) Foreign assistance has an indirect impact on poverty and the well-being of
recipient countries.
Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works  to  mitigate  poverty,  and poverty would be higher  in  the 
absence of aid.
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes. 
Source(Author)
2.3 African perspective
2.3.1 Africa’s needs and Western responses 
In terms of international standard comparisons, a bulk of African countries lies quite low. 
In line with Easterly (2005a), they occupy most of the bottom places in per capita income, life  
expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, percent of population living in extreme poverty(less than  a 
dollar a day),  infant mortality,  HIV prevalence and the HDI. By most objective standards of 
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assessment, the last four decades have been those of extreme growth disappointment in Africa. 
The  West  has  responded  to  Africa’s  tragedy  with  intensive  involvement  of  foreign-aid 
organizations and international agencies. In the mean, African countries receive much aid as a 
percentage of their GDPs than other developing countries.
In 2005, the West tried hardest to save Africa. The G8 in July of that year agreed to 
double foreign-aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion in a bid to finance the ‘Big 
push’, as well as cancel African aid-loans contracted during previous attempts at a ‘Big push’. 
Prior to this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive continent in the world. Two months 
up-the-hill (September 2005), world leaders gathered at the United Nations to further discuss 
progress on ending poverty in Africa. To put their concerns into perspective and match the facts 
with  figures,  as  of  2005  sub-Saharan  Africa  contained  11% of  the  world’s  population  and 
produced only 1% of global GDP. In the median African nation, 43% of the population lived on 
less than a dollar a day. On the World Food Program list, of the 23 countries with more than 35% 
of  the  population  malnourished,  17 were  in  Africa.  More  so,  human  development  has  been 
greatly  mitigated  by the  long and brutal  civil  wars  in  Angola,  Chad,  Somalia,  Sierra  Leon, 
Liberia…etc,  not  to  mention  Rwanda’s  genocide  and  recent  carnages  in  Darfur-Sudan.  The 
terrible  destructiveness  of  war’s  weight  saw the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo register  the 
world’s highest war casualties since World War II.  Indeed seven of the last eight recent cases of 
total  societal  breakdown into anarchy in the world known to literature have been in Africa: 
Angola,  Burundi,  Liberia,  Sudan,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia  and  Congo  Democratic  Republic 
(beside Afghanistan). 
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2.3.2 Theories and empirics of Western assistance to Africa
a) The Big-Push models and foreign-aid
The ‘Big-Push’ models suggest that Africa is poor because it is stuck in a ‘poverty trap’ 
(Easterly,  2005a).  Thus,  to  emerge  from  the  poverty  trap,  it  needs  a  large  aid-financed 
investment increase: a ‘Big-Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have 
been used to discuss the mechanisms of the poverty trap. 
The first  mechanism is  that,  savings  are  quite  low for people  who are very close to 
subsistence (as is confirmed by a Stone-Geary utility function). In a closed economy savings 
equal investment, thus investment is thin. In the Harrod-Domar model with the capital constraint 
binding, growth in GDP per capita is simply a linear function of the investment (=saving) rate 
minus  the  demographic  and  depreciation  rates.  If  the  saving  is  too  thin  to  compensate  for 
population growth and the depreciation of per capita, then per capital growth will be zero or 
negative. In the 1950s and 1960s, early development economists postulated a desirable per capita 
growth rate and calculated the “investment need” to meet this target: the distance between the 
low domestic saving rate and the “investment need” was termed the “Financing Gap”. The role 
of development assistance was therefore to cover the Financing Gap (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & 
Strout, 1966). This model predicted a strong growth effect for foreign-aid through its role in 
boosting domestic investment above what domestic savings would finance. Although this model 
soon  went  out  of  favor  in  the  academic  development  literature,  it  remained  interesting  in 
international organizations like the World Bank. Current policies advocating for the promotion 
of foreign-aid to Africa have explicitly quoted this model (Devarajan et al., 2002 at the World 
Bank; Blair  Commission on Africa, 2005; Sachs, 2005).  Sach(2005) posits that  “success in  
ending the poverty trap will be much easier than it appears”. He foretells, increase in foreign aid 
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and debt relief can end Africa’s poverty in our time. In a closed economy, savings are contingent 
not only on the distance from subsistence but also on the incentive to save depending on the rate 
of return to savings and investment. In an open economy, investment is not only a function of 
domestic  savings  but  also depends  on the rate  of  return  to  investment.  As demonstrated  by 
Collier et al.,(2001),  Africa’s extensive capital flight is estimated at 39%. Thus, this large chunk 
of Africa’s capital stock is held outside the continent because domestic investors compare the 
returns to domestic  and foreign investments  before making investment  decisions.  Also, bank 
lenders will invest in the economy if returns are attractive enough. In the Solow model, a strong 
relationship between income and saving-rates could generate multiple equilibria at low and high 
levels of capital stock, bringing to light the possibility of a poverty trap. Again, the low domestic 
savings would not be a palaver in an open economy in which investment responds to incentives. 
Kraay & Raddatz(2005)  have shown that the relationship between initial capital and savings 
must follow an S-shaped curve to generate a poverty-trap; though they fail to find evidence for 
this shape in the data. 
The second mechanism on poverty is a kind of nonconvexity of the production function 
in the Solow model. There could be strong external economies to investment or there maybe 
high  fixed  costs  associated  to  investment  projects  such  that  a  minimum  threshold  must  be 
surpassed for investment to be productive. This notion was part of the inspiration for the original 
article  that  first  suggested  a  ‘Big  Push’  (Rosentein-Rodan,  1943).  In  comparison  to  the 
‘Financing Gap’ model, this strand has had a longer shelf-life in the academic literature because 
theorists  have  a  great  zeal  in  models  with  multiple  equilibira(  Murphy  et  al.,  1989).  In 
emphasizing such nonconvexities, Sach(2005) has suggested that Africa is in a poverty trap. ‘Big 
Push’  models  predict  strong  effects  of  aid  on  investment  and  growth  (development).  This 
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prediction has been subject  to a substantial  empirical  literature which this  paper has already 
detailed above (see Table 1). 
b)Project interventions: education and health
Another  perspective  of  Africa’s  poverty has been that,  it  originates  from low human 
capital (poor health and education) and infrastructure. This emphasis which began in the 1960s is 
still a major theme in elucidating Africa’s poverty. While enrollments have expanded rapidly, the 
quality of education is hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school material, 
weak incentives for teachers, corruption in educational circles, bureaucracies and disruption of 
schooling by political crisis (Filmer & Pritchett, 1997).  In health, some of the initial progress 
has  been stifled,  possibly by corruption  in  the  health  system (studies  in  Cameroon,  Guinea, 
Uganda  and  Tanzania  estimated  that  30  to  70%  of  government  drugs  disappeared  before 
reaching patients).  Also, there are more complicated health problems that are not solvable with 
routine methods (Filmer et al., 2000; Pritchett & Woolcock,2004). 
c) Policies and growth models 
Another  view as to why Africa remains  poor is the structural  adjustment  program. It 
gained prominence in the early 1980s with the advent of the “Washington consensus” and the 
‘pro-free market’ arguments from respected intellectuals like the World Bank chief economist 
Anne Krueger. According to this strand, Africa is poor because its governments have chosen bad 
policies. Indeed, it is obvious that many African governments pursued policies very destructive 
of  growth  and  economic  development:  artificially  overvalued  currencies,  high  black  market 
premiums on foreign exchange, controls on interest rates that led to negative real interest rates 
for savers,  drastic  restrictions  on international  trade,  absence  of social  justice,  little  political 
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morality  and  reliance  on  state  companies  with  unsound  prospects  for  freedom of  economic 
enterprise. This ‘bad policies’ view of Africa’s poverty gave birth to a different  perception of 
the role of aid. The role of Western donors and international institutions within this framework 
was to induce changes in African macroeconomic policies by making aid contingent on such 
changes. Structural adjustment loans of the IMF and the World Bank were thus embodied in this 
framework: which had as objective an “adjustment with growth”.  How fruitful were these loans 
in facilitating “adjustment”, that is to say: changing policy? How instrumental was development 
assistance  in  inducing  better  policies?  The  answer  appears  to  be  that  Western  donors  and 
international institutions were not quite successful at changing policy (Alesina & Dollar, 2002; 
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Van de Walle, 2001; Easterly, 2005b). 
d)Aid, institutions and development
A substantial  literature  on  institutions  and  development  suggests  that  Africa  is  poor 
because it has poor institutions: dictatorships, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract 
enforcement,  violence  and  political  instability,  hostile  regulatory  environment  for  private 
business and high inflation. In order to eradicate African poverty, according to this strand the 
West needs to promote good institutions. Svensson(2000) finds that aid increases corruption in 
ethnically  fractionalized  countries(which   is  common  place  in  most  African  states).  Knack 
(2001) discovers that higher aid worsens bureaucratic quality,  leads to violating the law with 
more impunity and corruption (controlling for potential reverse causality). Similarly, Djankov et 
al.(2005) find that high aid caused substantial setbacks to democracy between 1960-1999. Indeed 
they found aid’s effect on democracy to be far worse than that of the “natural resource curse”. 
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e) Dysfunctional donors 
In accordance with Easterly (2005a), while all the attention in the aid and development 
debate is focused on Africa, it is also interesting to assess how effective donors have been at 
delivering valuable services to Africa. There have been alarming cases of donor dysfunction. An 
eloquent example is the over 2 billion US dollars spent on roads in Tanzania over the last 20 
years. Yet roads have not improved. Even by bureaucratic standards, foreign-aid bureaucracy is 
dire, why? Maybe it is because efforts and results in aid are largely unobservable and noticed 
only by the voiceless poor. Therefore, the absence of results visibility makes aid bureaucracies 
unaccountable.  As opposed to private firms or democratic governments in rich countries, aid 
agencies do not face a “voter test” or “a market test”. Africa’s poor could sink into the category 
of political orphans; with no voice or feedback on if aid is helping them and nobody accountable  
to them as well. 
2.4 The scope and positioning of the current paper
2.4.1 Scope of development assistance 
In  line  with   Clement  et  al.(2004),  aggregate  aid   could  be  divided  into  three  main 
strands: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid(likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) 
aid that affects growth only over the long-term(if at all); such as aid to support democracy, the 
environment, health or education; and (3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in the long 
term, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure and aid 
for  productive  sectors  such as  agricultural  and industrial.  While  aid  effectiveness  in  studies 
implicitly define donors’ objective as solely the promotion of economic growth or the reduction 
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of poverty in the recipient countries, a parallel strand of literature on aid allocation has shown 
that most donors are always after  a different underlying agenda: allocating aid according to their 
own strategic interests. Masud & Yontcheva (2005) have emphasized that where a significant 
part of aid is allocated for strategic purposes, no positive impact in terms of growth or poverty 
alleviation  should  be  expected.  We  partially  refute  this  claim  by  positing  that;  foreign-aid 
irrespective of vested donor-interest should contribute to development or economic deterioration 
(even in marginal terms) either directly or indirectly. 
2.4.2 Positioning of this paper in the literature 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is fourfold. Firstly, we deviate from the 
mainstream  approach  to  the  aid-development  nexus  and  assess  the  effectiveness  of  foreign 
assistance  from  three  dimensions  (GDP  growth,  GDP  per  capita  growth  and  human 
development). Secondly, a substantial body of work in the literature is based on data collected 
between 1960 and 1995. By using much recent data, the paper provides an updated account of 
the nexus with more focused policy implications. Another novelty worth pointing-out within this 
contribution is the use of an updated human development index (adjusted for inequality) first 
published in 2010 that corrects past works of the bulk of criticisms inherent in the first index. 
Thirdly,  owing  to  the  debate  on  methodological  issues  in  the  assessment  of  the  impact  of 
foreign-aid,  this  paper  provides  new  dimensions  to  the  debate  by  investigating  the  aid-
development  nexus,  when  existing  development  dynamic  levels  matter.  Thus  there  is  the 
presumption here that certain development thresholds might be imperative for the effectiveness 
of foreign-aid and hence blanket aid policies might not be appropriate, unless they are contingent 
on the prevailing levels of development dynamics (GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and 
human development)  and tailored  differently across  the least  and most  advanced developing 
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countries. Fourthly, with 2015 approaching it is high time to assess donors’ objective of reaching 
the MDGs. In plainer terms, assessing the effectiveness of development assistance on human 
development  in  the  light  of  the  three  points  highlighted  above in  the  run-up to  2015 could 
provide crucial policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on their assistance impact.
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine a sample of 22 countries for the period 1996-2009 with data from African 
Development  Indicators  (ADI)  of  the  World  Bank (WB).  Development  dependent  variables 
include  GDP  growth,  GDP  per  capita  growth  and  the  HDI  (adjusted  for  inequality).  The 
independent variable of interest is Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). For robustness 
purposes we use three different NODA indicators: Total NODA; NODA from the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries; and NODA from Multilateral Donors. While the first is 
used in the empirical section, the last two have been used for robustness checks.  Borrowing 
from  recent  development  threshold  literature  (Asongu,  2012c),  we  control  for  institutional 
quality  (polity  and  democracy),  openness  (trade),  inflation,  investment  (public,  private  and 
domestic) and population growth. Summary statistics with presentation of countries (Appendix 
1), variable definitions (Appendix 2) and correlation analysis (Appendix 3) are detailed in the 
appendices. 
3.2 Methodology
In  line  with  Billger  &  Goel  (2009)  and  recent  development  threshold  literature 
(Asongu,2012c),  to  determine  whether  existing  levels  in  development  dynamics  affect  how 
development assistance comes into play, we use quantile regression. This approach permits us to 
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investigate if the relationship between development dynamics and foreign-aid differs throughout 
the distribution of the development dynamics (Koenker & Hallock, 2001).
Some studies on the determinants of development are based on estimation by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), which report parameter estimates at the conditional mean of development. 
Whereas mean effects are certainly important, this study expands such findings using quantile 
regression. In addition, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS regression is that the error 
term and the dependent variable are normally distributed. However, in quantile regression the 
error term need not be normally distributed. Thus, based on this estimation technique we are able 
to  carefully  assess  the  impact  of  foreign-aid  throughout  the  conditional  distributions  with 
particular emphasis on high and low growth countries. Quantile regression( hence QR) yields 
parameters  estimated  at  multiple  points  in  the  conditional  distribution  of  the  dependent 
variable(Koenker  &  Bassett,  1978)  and  has  been  relevant  in  recent  development 
literature(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). Beyond these facts, the choice of this 
estimation  technique  is  in  line  with  the  research  goal.  The  θ th  quantile  estimator  of  the 
endogenous variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem.
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Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example the 50th or 75th 
quantiles  (with  θ =0.50 or  0.75  respectively) by  approximately  weighing  the  residuals.  The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is:
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
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where unique slope parameters are derived for each θ th quantile of interest. This formulation is 
analogous to  βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at  the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable.  For the model in Eq.(2) the 
dependent variable iy  is the development  indicator(GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, HDI) 
while  ix  contains a constant term, foreign-aid, population growth, democracy, polity, domestic 
investment, inflation, public investment, trade, and private investment. The quantile estimation 
approach is more robust than the OLS approach in the presence of outliers when the distribution 
of the dependent variable is a highly non-normal pattern (Okada & Samreth, 2012).  We also 
report  findings  for  Least  Absolute  Deviations  (LAD) which  should  match  those of  the  0.5 th 
quantile.  
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Summary of results 
The results presented in Tables 2-3 include OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects  and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate 
quantiles in the conditional distributions of the development variable.  In the interpretation of 
estimated coefficients, it is worth noting that smaller values (in conditional distributions) of the 
dependent variable denote less development (economic, economic per capita and human). Table 
2 shows results for development in overall economic (Panel A) and per capita economic (Panel 
B) perspectives. Table 3 reports findings for human development.
From the findings in Table 2 below, the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) The 
positive incidence of development assistance on general economic prosperity increases across 
the  distribution.  This  implies  the  positive  aid  elasticities  of  prosperity  increase;  with  higher 
magnitudes in top quantiles of the economic prosperity distribution. This finding is consistent 
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across specifications of Panel A. (2) With respect to Panel B on ‘per capita income prosperity’ 
regressions  (with  the  ‘thin  exceptions’  of  the  top  and  bottom  quantiles  in  the  second 
specification),  the conclusion drawn from findings in Panel A still holds. It follows that,  the 
positive effect of foreign-aid on per capita economic prosperity increases across the distribution 
(from countries with the least to those with the highest per capita income prosperity). (3) Most of 
the control variables are significant with the right signs: as inflation seriously inhibits economic 
prosperity (at macro and micro levels) and investment (domestic, private and public) generally 
improve economic prosperity.  
Table 3 reports findings for human development regressions. Based on the aid elasticities 
of human development,  the following conclusion could be drawn. The negative incidence of 
development  assistance  on  human  development  is  not  significantly  different  across  the 
distribution. This establishment is valid across specifications. It follows that existing levels of 
human development may not affect the manner in which foreign-aid negatively affects human 
development.  Most  control  variables  are  significant  with  the  right  signs  since:  inflation  and 
population growth seriously infringe on human development while investment (public, domestic 
and private) improve human development. 
17
Table 2: Economic Prosperity; OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions 
Panel A: General Economic Prosperity 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 1.665** 1.664* -2.128** -0.040 1.880*** 2.594*** 4.960***
(0.046) (0.092) (0.010) (0.959) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000)
Development Assistance 0.098*** 0.122*** 0.075*** 0.100*** 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.139***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Polity  -0.061 -0.044 0.078** 0.001 -0.040 -0.059 -0.101**
(0.108) (0.265) (0.040) (0.966) (0.215) (0.112) (0.023)
Trade  -0.014** -0.013*** 0.0003 -0.007 -0.013** -0.020*** -0.029***
(0.029) (0.008) (0.954) (0.250) (0.016) (0.001) (0.000)
Inflation -0.015*** -0.013** -0.009** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.022***
(0.000) (0.038) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Domestic Investment  0.171*** 0.159*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.147*** 0.224*** 0.219***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Specification 2
Constant -1.593* -0.669 -3.879*** -2.838** -0.669 -0.482 2.273*
(0.077) (0.520) (0.004) (0.024) (0.301) (0.654) (0.054)
Development Assistance 0.064** 0.064* 0.096** 0.055 0.064*** 0.088*** 0.099***
(0.013) (0.063) (0.015) (0.126) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
Democracy  0.005 0.019 0.250*** 0.083 0.019 -0.003 -0.132*
(0.924) (0.685) (0.003) (0.291) (0.623) (0.964) (0.075)
Private Investment 0.141*** 0.110*** 0.127** 0.108** 0.110*** 0.166*** 0.131***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.021) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Public Investment  0.265*** 0.228*** 0.102 0.251*** 0.228*** 0.308*** 0.307***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.286) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth 0.836*** 0.672*** 0.315 0.727** 0.672*** 0.748*** 0.851***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.380) (0.027) (0.000) (0.008) (0.006)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Panel B: Per capita Economic Prosperity 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.971 -1.067 -3.903*** -2.054** -1.067 0.210 1.831**
(0.226) (0.234) (0.009) (0.019) (0.132) (0.835) (0.034)
Development Assistance 0.056** 0.050* 0.037 0.035 0.050** 0.091*** 0.106***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.384) (0.164) (0.014) (0.002) (0.000)
Polity  -0.043 -0.026 0.080 0.017 -0.026 -0.048 -0.051
(0.235) (0.444) (0.242) (0.658) (0.413) (0.294) (0.192)
Trade  -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.0008 -0.005 -0.011 -0.016**
(0.475) (0.247) (0.755) (0.895) (0.322) (0.163) (0.012)
Inflation -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.010 -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.022***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.203) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Domestic Investment  0.166*** 0.172*** 0.117* 0.128*** 0.172*** 0.208*** 0.231***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Specification 2
Constant -1.488* -0.704 -3.760* -2.632** -0.704 -0.636 2.516***
(0.093) (0.502) (0.051) (0.029) (0.342) (0.588) (0.008)
Development Assistance 0.061** 0.063* 0.093* 0.053 0.063*** 0.085** 0.049*
(0.017) (0.051) (0.092) (0.123) (0.003) (0.012) (0.072)
Democracy  0.008 0.025 0.244** 0.080 0.025 0.017 -0.153**
(0.882) (0.611) (0.043) (0.283) (0.587) (0.815) (0.010)
Private Investment 0.137*** 0.105** 0.125 0.105** 0.105*** 0.160*** 0.111***
(0.000) (0.011) (0.104) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Public Investment  0.263*** 0.248*** 0.100 0.238*** 0.248*** 0.305*** 0.373***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.458) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth -0.198 -0.377 -0.695 -0.307 -0.377* -0.167 -0.244
(0.392) (0.121) (0.168) (0.330) (0.052) (0.585) (0.327)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Notes.  Dependent variable is Economic prosperity. *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., 
Q 0.1) signify nations where  economic prosperity   is least. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute 
Deviations. 
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Table 3: Human development ; OLS, LAD and Quantile Regressions 
Human Development Index
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.401*** 0.371*** 0.329*** 0.381*** 0.371*** 0.346*** 0.390***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Polity  0.001** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.001* 0.002* 0.0001
(0.029) (0.197) (0.000) (0.189) (0.067) (0.051) (0.861)
Trade  0.0008*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002* -0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000)
Domestic Investment  0.003*** 0.006*** 0.0009 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.260) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Specification 2
Constant 0.522*** 0.511*** 0.529*** 0.551*** 0.511*** 0.494*** 0.540***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy  0.003*** 0.003** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.005***
(0.001) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.185) (0.000)
Private Investment 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public Investment  0.004*** 0.005** 0.002 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.045) (0.233) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth -0.043*** -0.036** -0.093*** -0.068*** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.031***
(0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Human Development Index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  human development  is least. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least 
Absolute Deviations.
4.2 Discussion and policy recommendations 
Before  diving  into  the  discussion  of  the  findings,  it  is  worthwhile  pointing-out  the 
intuition motivating this paper. The concern over the effectiveness of development assistance has 
been  widely  debated  in  the  aid-development  literature  since  the  institution  of  the  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) programs five decades ago. A great proportion of the literature 
which  focuses  on  the  macro  economic  benefits  of  aid  has  been  mixed  at  best.  Beside  the 
antagonistic  picture  of  the  macroeconomic  merits  of  development-assistance  painted  by 
mainstream research, there has been an almost exclusive focus on the effect of aid-flows on GDP 
growth  and  other  macroeconomic  variables  (investment  or  public  consumption),  with  the 
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underlying assumption being the notion that aid is destined to bridge the saving-investment gap 
poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005a). Surprisingly, there 
has been much less research conducted on the impact of foreign-aid on the evolution of human 
development (Masud & Yontcheva,2005), in spite of the shift in objectives announced by the 
donor community which have evolved from intensive industrialization programs advocated in 
the 1950s to more poverty reducing objectives such the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs). 
The  object  of  this  paper  has  been  to  assess  development  thresholds  of  development 
assistance.  In  so  doing,  we  have  examined  the  effectiveness  of  foreign-aid  through-out  the 
conditional distributions of development dynamics. Two main findings have be established. (1) 
The effectiveness of aid in economic prosperity (at micro and macro levels) increases in positive 
magnitude across the distribution. This implies high-growth countries are more likely to benefit 
from development assistance (in terms of economic growth) than their low-growth counterparts. 
(2)  Existing  levels  in  human  development  do  not  affect  the  manner  in  which  foreign-aid 
negatively  affects  human  development.  Thus  the  negative  incidence  of  aid  on  human 
development  is  almost  similar  across  the  distribution  of  human  development.  As  a  policy 
implication,  while  blanket  policies  on  the  aid-economic  prosperity   nexus   are  unlikely  to 
succeed in Africa and thus should be contingent on the prevailing levels of economic growth and 
tailored differently across the high and low growth countries, common policies could be applied 
within  the  framework  of  the  aid-human  development  nexus  regardless  of  country-
specific(existing) human emancipation  levels. 
From a general  perspective,  these findings  only partially  validate  recent  results  (with 
updated  data)  in  the  African  continent  which  have  established  the  existence  of  reversed 
economics and a negative aid-human development nexus (Asongu, 2012b). While the results on 
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human development  fully  reflect  those of  Asongu (2012b),  those on economic  development 
reflect a positive aid-economic prosperity nexus. This difference is essentially methodological 
and points to the interesting character of exploring the aid-development nexus through-out the 
conditional  distributions  of  development  dynamics  (quantile  regression).  From  a  general 
standpoint however, findings of the paper may either reflect the first or second strand of conflicts 
in the literature (as summarized in Table 1). Whereas human development regressions broadly 
reflects the negative aid-development nexus(Mosley,1992; Reichel, 1995; Ghura, 1995; Boone, 
1996; Pedersen,1996; Asongu, 2012ab), economic prosperity regressions are in generally in line 
with the positive aid-development nexus(Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Ghura, 1995; Guillaumont & 
Chauvet, 2001; Collier & Dehn, 2001; Collier & Dollar,2001; Feeny, 2003; Gomanee et al.,2003; 
Clement et al.,2004; Ishfaq,2004; Mosley et al.,2004; Addison et al.,2005; Fielding et al.,2006). 
 It is also interesting to highlight that this paper has drawn much from the globalization-
development nexus. It has been well documented in the globalization-development literature that 
certain  “threshold”  levels  of  financial  and  institutional  development  are  imperative  for  an 
economy get the full indirect benefits and reduced risks of capital account globalization (Henry, 
2007;  Rodrik  &  Subramanian,  2009;  Kose  et  al.,  2011).  Empirically  assessing  the  aid-
development nexus in the light of available weight of empirical evidence on ‘threshold theories’ 
(from the openness-development literature) has provided relevant policy implications on how 
existing  economic  prosperity  and  human  development  levels  matter  in  the  aid-development 
African nexus. 
5. Conclusion
The  contribution  of  this  paper  to  the  literature  has  been  fourfold.  Firstly,  we  have 
deviated  from  the  mainstream  approach  to  the  aid-development  nexus  and  assessed  the 
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effectiveness of foreign-aid from three dimensions (GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and 
human development).  Secondly,  a substantial  body of work in the literature is based on data 
collected between 1960 and 1995. By using much recent data, this paper has provided an updated 
account of the nexus with more focused policy implications. Another novelty worth pointing-out 
within  this  contribution  is  the  use  of  an  updated  human  development  index  (adjusted  for 
inequality) first published in 2010 that corrects past works of the bulk of criticisms inherent in 
the first index. Thirdly, owing to the debate on methodological issues in the assessment of the 
impact of foreign-aid, this paper has provided new dimensions to the debate by investigating the 
aid-development nexus, when existing development dynamics matter. Thus there has been the 
presumption here that certain development thresholds might be imperative for the effectiveness 
of foreign-aid and hence blanket aid policies might not be appropriate, unless they are contingent 
on prevailing levels of development dynamics (GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and human 
development) and tailored differently across the least and most advanced developing countries. 
Fourthly, with 2015 approaching it was high time to assess donors’ objective of reaching the 
MDGs.  In  plainer  terms,  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  development  assistance  on  human 
development by virtue of the three points highlighted above in the run-up to 2015 has provided 
crucial policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on their assistance impact.
Two main  findings  have  been  established.  (1)  The  effectiveness  of  aid  in  economic 
prosperity (at micro and macro levels) increases in positive magnitude across the distribution. 
This implies high-growth countries are more likely to benefit (in terms of economic prosperity)  
from development assistance than their low-growth counterparts. (2) Existing levels of human 
development  do  not  affect  the  manner  in  which  foreign-aid  negatively  affects  human 
development. Thus the negative incidence of aid on human development is almost similar across 
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the  distribution  of  human  development.  Two policy  implications  have  resulted.  (1)  Blanket 
policies on the aid-economic prosperity nexus are unlikely to succeed in Africa;  thus policy 
measures should be contingent on prevailing levels of economic growth and tailored differently 
across  high  and  low  growth  countries.  (2)  Common  policies  could  be  applied  within  the 
framework of the aid-human development nexus regardless of country-specific (existing) human 
emancipation levels.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries 
Panel A:Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Development
Economic Prosperity(GDPg) 4.691 4.058 -12.67 33.629 308
Per capita Economic Prosperity(GDPpcg) 2.261 3.880 -15.15 29.062 308
Human  Development(IHDI) 0.462 0.121 0.237 0.745 308
Foreign Aid  Development Assistance(NODA) 8.592 9.124 -0.251 95.482 308
Control 
Variables
Democracy 2.740 4.123 -8.000 10.000 308
Polity 0.353 5.875 -9.000 10.000 308
Trade 70.140 35.404 17.859 209.41 308
Inflation 14.364 49.451 -8.974 513.91 308
Public Investment 7.451 3.674 0.000 23.785 308
Private Investment 12.383 6.156 1.999 49.594 308
Population Growth 2.373 1.000 0.508 10.043 308
Domestic  Investment 19.913 6.648 2.100 59.723 308
Panel B:Presentation of Countries
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo 
Republic, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max:Maximun. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. IHDI: Inequality adjusted  
Human Development Index. 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Source
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP Growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Per Capita Economic prosperity GDPpcg GDP per capita Growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Human Development    IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index World Bank(WDI)
Total Development Assistance DA Total Development assistance(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Development Assistance   2 DAMD Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Development Assistance  3 DADAC Development Assistance from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Democracy   Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Polity  Polity Level of Polity Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Trade(Openness) Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Inflation Infl Consumer Price Index(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Public Investment  PubIvt Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Private Investment PrivIvt Gross Private Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Domestic Investment  DomIvt Gross Domestic Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average population growth rate (annual %) World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee. 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis 
Development Development Assistance Control Variables
GDPg GDPpcg IHDI DA DAMD DADAC Demo Polity Trade Inflation PubIvt PrivIvt DomIvt Popg
1.000 0.961 -0.063 0.232 0.267 0.181 0.098 0.037 -0.081 -0.243 0.232 0.142 0.247 0.231 GDPg
1.000 0.092 0.125 0.143 0.098 0.132 0.053 0.024 -0.259 0.250 0.178 0.289 -0.027 GDPpcg
1.000 -0.586 -0.637 -0.475 0.265 0.107 0.436 -0.231 0.099 0.322 0.349 -0.578 IHDI
1.000 0.799 0.955 -0.034 0.095 -0.252 -0.030 0.138 -0.144 -0.065 0.413 DA
1.000 0.586 0.025 0.132 -0.310 -0.034 0.237 -0.158 -0.021 0.480 DAMD
1.000 -0.057 0.065 -0.186 -0.023 0.067 -0.115 -0.077 0.320 DADAC
1.000 0.918 0.082 -0.272 0.331 0.186 0.356 -0.106 Demo
1.000 -0.034 -0.139 0.267 0.130 0.266 -0.040 Polity
1.000 -0.091 0.145 0.212 0.270 -0.407 Trade
1.000 -0.219 -0.079 -0.197 0.039 Inflation
1.000 -0.109 0.436 -0.028 PubIvt
1.000 0.827 -0.126 PrivIvt
1.000 -0.127 DomIvt
1.000 Popg
 GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. DA: Development Assistance. DAMD: Development Assistance from
 Multilateral Donors. DADAC: Development Assistance from  Development Assistance Committee. Demo: Democracy. PubIvt: Public Investment. PrivIvt: Private Investment. 
DomIvt: Domestic Investment. Popg: Population growth. 
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